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CITIZENS UNITED AND THE
ORPHANED ANTIDISTORTION RATIONALE
RICHARD L. HASEN*
INTRODUCTION
Soon after his retirement, Supreme Court Justice John Paul Stevens gave
an interview to the CBS television program 60 Minutes. Interviewer Scott Pelley
asked the Justice to identify the Court‘s ―mistake‖ in Citizens United v. FEC,1 the
5-4 decision striking down corporate spending limits in candidate elections.
When Justice Stevens, author of the primary Citizens United dissent,2 asked which
mistake he should emphasize, Pelley told him to choose. Justice Stevens then
responded: ―Well, you know, basically an election is a debate. And most debates
you have rules. And I think Congress is the one that ought to make those rules.
And if the debate is distorted by having one side have so much greater resources
than the other that sometimes may distort the ability to decide the debate on the
merits. You—you want to be sure that—that it‘s a fair fight.‖3
Reacting to the Stevens interview, David Bossie, the President of Citizens
United, lauded the Court‘s decision. He said that allowing corporations to spend
their general treasury funds on elections (rather than being limited only to political
action committee funds raised from human sources) ―will allow the conservative
movement to participate on a ‗level playing field‘ with groups like MoveOn.org
and labor unions.‖4
How strange that both the Citizens United prime dissenter and plaintiff
described the decision in terms of its effect on political equality, an interest the

*

Visiting Professor of Law, UC Irvine School of Law; William H. Hannon Distinguished
Professor of Law, Loyola Law School, Los Angeles. Thanks to Ellen Aprill and Bob Mutch for
useful comments and suggestions.
1
130 S.Ct. 876 (2010).
2
Justice Thomas also wrote a dissent, for himself alone, on disclosure issues. Id. at 979 (Thomas,
J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
3
CBS News, 60 Minutes, Supreme Court Justice John Paul Stevens Opens Up, Nov. 26, 2010,
available
at:
http://www.cbsnews.com/stories/2010/11/23/60minutes/main7082572.shtml?tag=contentMain;con
tentBody.
4
Ryan J. Reilly, Citizens United President Enjoys ‘Bitching And Moaning’ Over Supreme Court
Case,
TPM
Muckraker,
Dec.
1,
2010,
available
at:
http://tpmmuckraker.talkingpointsmemo.com/2010/12/citizens_united_president_enjoys_bitching_
and_moan.php.
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Supreme Court in Citizens United termed the ―antidistortion interest.‖5 On 60
Minutes, Justice Stevens‘ main complaint about the decision was that the unequal
wealth of corporations could now distort electoral outcomes. In contrast, Mr.
Bossie defended the decision on grounds that it will create greater equality across
groups engaged in political battles.
The irony in this debate over whether Citizens United promotes or
impedes political equality is that Mr. Bossie‘s group argued before the Supreme
Court that the First Amendment barred taking political equality concerns into
account in fashioning campaign finance rules,6 and Justice Stevens‘ dissent did its
best to avoid acknowledging that it was defending corporate spending limits, in
part, on political equality grounds. Justice Stevens‘ failure to expressly defend
corporate spending limits on political equality grounds came after the government
had abandoned the rationale in the Supreme Court.
This brief Essay argues that the antidistortion argument did not deserve to
be orphaned, and remains—as the quotes by Justice Stevens and Mr. Bossie
illustrate—a key animating principle in thinking about the desirability of
campaign finance laws. Part I explains how the antidistortion argument became
an orphan in Citizens United, laying the blame with the Solicitor General‘s office
and with Justice Stevens muddled Citizens United dissent. Part II explains the
cost of this orphaning for the future of campaign finance and related laws: keeping
the political equality rationale in the closet will make it harder to get legislative
and judicial change in the campaign finance arena going forward, and it prevents a
full and honest debate about the desirability and cost of campaign finance laws
justified on political equality grounds.

5

Citizens United, 130 S.Ct. at 903. Until the end of this Essay, I use the terms ―antidistortion
rationale‖ and ―political equality rationale‖ interchangeably. At the end, I explain more fully the
relationship between the two terms.
6
Citizens United v. FEC, Supplemental Brief of Appellant, No. 08-205, at 1, available at:
http://electionlawblog.org/archives/Citizens%20United--Supplemental%20Brief.pdf (―For the
proper disposition of this case, the Court should reject the anti-distortion rationale for suppressing
corporate political speech formulated in Austin and relied upon in McConnell—which is the only
justification the government has advanced for prohibiting Video On Demand distribution of
Hillary‖).
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I.
HOW THE ANTIDISTORTION RATIONALE WAS ORPHANED7
A.

From Austin to Citizens United

Before Citizens United, the leading case on the constitutionality of
corporate spending limits in candidate elections was Austin v. Michigan Chamber
of Commerce.8 In that 1990 case, the Supreme Court upheld corporate spending
limits in candidate elections against a First Amendment challenge. Austin did so
based upon what the Supreme Court in Citizens United later termed9 the
antidistortion interest: the government‘s interest in curbing the ―corrosive and
distorting effects of immense aggregations of wealth that are accumulated with the
help of the corporate form and that have little or no correlation to the public‘s
support for the corporation‘s political ideas.‖10
Austin itself was somewhat of a surprise. Earlier, in the leading 1976 case,
Buckley v. Valeo,11 the Supreme Court, applying strict scrutiny, held that spending
limits imposed on individuals violated the First Amendment.12 The Court
concluded that individual spending limits could not be justified by an
anticorruption interest, because of the lack of evidence that independent spending
could corrupt candidates.13 Nor could the limits be justified on equality grounds,
because doing so would be ―wholly foreign‖ to the First Amendment.14
Though Austin sought to characterize the antidistortion interest as a
―different type of corruption in the political arena,‖15 it fairly can be understood as

7

This Part assumes the reader is familiar with the Court‘s campaign finance jurisprudence
generally and how the Citizens United decision changed that jurisprudence. For readers without
that background, see Richard L. Hasen, Citizens United and the Illusion of Coherence, 109 MICH.
L. REV. 581 (2011).
8
494 U.S. 652 (1990).
9
Citizens United, 130 U.S. at 903.
10
Austin, 494 U.S. at 659-60.
11
424 U.S. 1 (1976).
12
Id. at 20-21, 44-51.
13
Id. at 47.
14
Id. at 48-49.
15
494 U.S. at 660. In First National Bank of Boston v. Bellotti, the Supreme Court left open the
question whether independent corporate spending could be justified on traditional anticorruption
grounds. 435 U.S. 765, 788 n.26 (1978). The Court did so despite Buckley‘s statement that
independent individual spending cannot corrupt because of the absence of coordination, and in
Citizens United the Court rejected the possibility of proving corruption by independent
expenditures left open by Footnote 26 of Bellotti. Citizens United, 130 S.Ct. at 909. For further
discussion of Footnote 26, see Hasen, supra note 7, at 596, 618.
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voicing a type of political equality concern.16 That is, under Austin ―corruption,‖
the way corporations ―distort‖ the political process is not through quid pro quo
corruption—―dollars for political favors‖—or even ―undue influence,‖ but rather
through corporate spending that is disproportionate to the public‘s support for the
corporation‘s political ideas.
B.

The Citizens United Briefing and Argument: Abandonment
Citizens United presented a delicate task for the Solicitor General‘s office,
the arm of the United States Department of Justice charged with defending the
position of the United States before the Supreme Court. Though the Supreme
Court in the 2003 case of McConnell v. FEC17 had reaffirmed Austin18 and
extended it to labor unions, it was clear by the time the Court agreed to hear
Citizens United that the Court had moved from its period of greatest deference
toward legislative efforts at campaign finance regulation to its period of greatest
skepticism.19 The cause of the shift was the replacement of retiring Justice
O‘Connor on the Court with Justice Alito, swinging a 5-justice majority generally
voting to uphold campaign finance regulation to a 5-justice majority voting to
strike such regulations down. Among the cases decided by this new majority was
a 2008 case, Davis v. FEC,20 in which five Justices on the Court emphatically
rejected political equality as a permissible rationale for campaign finance
regulation.
In the initial Supreme Court briefing in Citizens United, the government
certainly did not stress the antidistortion argument from Austin. But the
government did not abandon the rationale either. In its original merits brief, the
government wrote:
Congress historically has imposed particularly stringent limits on the
electoral advocacy of corporations and labor unions. These restrictions
reflect a legislative judgment that the special characteristics of the
corporate structure require particularly careful regulation, and this Court
16

This is a point I made in RICHARD L. HASEN, THE SUPREME COURT AND ELECTION LAW:
JUDGING EQUALITY FROM BAKER V. CARR TO BUSH V. GORE 114 (2003). In his concurring opinion
in Citizens United, Chief Justice Roberts cited this work and others to support the proposition that
Austin‘s rationale was one grounded in political equality concerns. Citizens United, 130 S.Ct. at
922 & n.2.
17
540 U.S. 93 (2003).
18
As with many points about Citizens United, this point about reaffirmation is controversial. See
Hasen, supra note 7, at 599 (discussing dispute among Justices in Citizens United over whether
Supreme Court had ―reaffirmed‖ Austin in other cases).
19
See id. at 587-90.
20
128 S. Ct. 2759, 2773 (2008).
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has consistently respect[ed] that judgment. In particular, because of the
numerous advantages that the corporate form confers, a corporation‘s
ability to pay for electoral advocacy has ―little or no correlation to the
public‘s support for the corporation‘s political ideas.‖ McConnell, 540
U.S. 205 (quoting Austin).21
The Supreme Court initially heard argument in Citizens United in March
2009,22 and the government‘s case appeared to collapse when the Deputy Solicitor
General had trouble answering a hypothetical question about the regulation of
corporate-funded books containing ―the functional equivalent of express
advocacy.‖23 At the end of Court‘s term in June 2009, the Court announced it
would rehear the case, and it asked for supplemental briefing on the following
question: ―For the proper disposition of this case, should the Court overrule either
or both Austin v. Michigan Chamber of Commerce, 494 U.S. 652 (1990), and the
part of McConnell v. Federal Election Comm’n, 540 U.S. 93 (2003), which
addresses the facial validity of Section 203 of the Bipartisan Campaign Reform
Act of 2002, 2 U.S.C. §441b?‖24
The Solicitor General‘s office had to decide how to handle the question of
Austin‘s vitality in the supplemental briefing. The issue was a high stakes one.
Former Harvard Law School dean Elena Kagan had taken over as the Solicitor
General, and she was set to argue this case, her first appellate argument in her
career. She was widely rumored (correctly) to be on the short list for a Supreme
Court opening. The Court‘s supplemental briefing order called into question a
key part of federal campaign finance law. People were going to be paying
attention to this argument.
The government had a number of reasons to downplay the antidistortion
argument: it was sure to generate hostile questions from at least some Justices
(who had dissented in Austin or who had shown skepticism to the constitutionality
of regulation in recent cases); it was hard to see five votes to accept the argument,
especially in light of Davis; as a law professor Kagan had written an article calling
21

Citizens United v. FEC, Brief for the Appellee, No. 08-205, at 15, available at:
http://www.abanet.org/publiced/preview/briefs/pdfs/07-08/08-205_Appellee.pdf (some citations
and quotation marks omitted).
22
Citizens United v. FEC, No. 08-205, Tr. Oral Arg., Mar. 24, 2009,
http://www.supremecourt.gov/oral_arguments/argument_transcripts/08-205.pdf.
23
Adam Liptak, Justices Consider Interplay Between First Amendment and Campaign Finance
Laws, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 24, 2009, http://www.nytimes.com/2009/03/25/washington/25scotus.html.
24
128 S.Ct. 1732. Elsewhere I argue that under the constitutional avoidance doctrine the Court
should not have asked for this supplemental briefing, or overruled Austin or part of McConnell in
this case. See Richard L. Hasen, Constitutional Avoidance and Anti-Avoidance by the Roberts
Court, 2009 SUP. CT. REV. 181.
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Austin‘s antidistortion argument into question;25 and spending time arguing over
antidistortion would take time away at oral argument to advance other, potentially
more convincing arguments to sustain the corporate spending limits.
In the supplemental brief,26 and at the second oral argument, the
government did more than simply downplay the Austin antidistortion rationale: it
abandoned it entirely. The government sought—without any apparent textual
basis—to recast the antidistortion language in Austin as one about protecting
shareholders from the political spending decisions of corporate managers.27 It
also tried to defend corporate spending limits on more traditional anticorruption
grounds. The brief made no mention of antidistortion as a political equality
rationale or quoted the key Austin language.
At the second Citizens United oral argument,28 when pressed by Chief
Justice Roberts, General Kagan explicitly abandoned the antidistortion rationale:
CHIEF JUSTICE ROBERTS: …putting the quid pro quo interest aside,
where in your supplemental briefing do you support the interest that was
articulated by the Court in Austin?
GENERAL KAGAN: Where we talk about shareholder protection and
where we talk about the distortion of the electoral process that occurs
when corporations use their shareholders‘ money who may or may not
agree –
CHIEF JUSTICE ROBERTS: I understand that to be a different interest.
That is the shareholder protection interest as opposed to the fact that
corporations have such wealth and they[] distort the marketplace.
25

Elena Kagan, Private Speech, Public Purpose: The Role of Governmental Motive in First
Amendment Doctrine, 63 U. CHI. L. REV. 413, 464-472 (1996). Before Kagan was confirmed as a
Supreme Court Justice, I noted the difficulty in knowing whether she would have voted with the
majority or dissenters in Citizens United if she had been serving on the Supreme Court when it
decided Citizens United. Richard L. Hasen, The Big Ban Theory, SLATE (May 24, 2010, 12:16
PM), http://www.slate.com/id/2254830/.
26
Citizens United v. FEC, No. 08-205, Supplemental Brief of the Appellee, available at:
http://www.scotusblog.com/wp-content/uploads/2009/07/08-205_us_supp.pdf.
27
Remarkably, the supplemental brief cites the relevant pages from Austin (page 658-660)
containing the antidistortion language, but the government never quotes that key language in the
brief. Instead, the brief states: ―[E]lectoral advocacy by for-profit corporations poses distinct risks,
both to the public interest and to the corporation‘s shareholders, that are not implicated by
individual electioneering. 494 U.S. at 658-660.‖ Id. at 6.
28
Citizens United v. FEC, No. 08-205, Tr. Oral Arg., Sept. 29, 2009, available at:
http://www.supremecourt.gov/oral_arguments/argument_transcripts/08205%5BReargued%5D.pdf.
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GENERAL KAGAN: Well, [I] I think that they are connected because
both come CHIEF JUSTICE ROBERTS: [S]o am I right then in saying that in the
supplemental briefing you do not rely at all on the market distortion
rationale on which Austin relied; not the shareholder rationale, not the quid
pro quo rationale, the market distortion issue. These corporations have a
lot of money.
GENERAL KAGAN: We do not rely at all on Austin to the extent that
anybody takes Austin to be suggesting anything about the equalization of a
speech market. So I know that that‘s the way that many people understand
the distortion rationale of Austin, and if that‘s the way the Court
understands i[t], we do not rely at all on that.29
C.
The Muddled Treatment of the Antidistortion Rationale in Justice Stevens’
Dissent
As one would expect, the Citizens United majority pounced on the
government‘s failure to defend the antidistortion interest. The Court wrote that the
government ―all but abandon[ed] reliance‖ on Austin‘s antidistortion interest,30
and the Court then strongly rejected antidistortion as a permissible governmental
interest.31 Chief Justice Roberts, in a concurring opinion dedicated to defending
the overruling of Austin as unavoidable and the Court‘s overruling of it in Citizens
United as not activist,32 leaned heavily on the government‘s concession as well.
At the end of a litany of reasons for rejecting the antidistortion rationale, the Chief
wrote: ―Finally and most importantly‖ was the government‘s own failure to
29

Id. Once General Kagan received a nomination to serve on the Supreme Court, newspapers
considered whether the abandonment of Austin distortion was a strategic error. Adam Liptak,
Stints in Court May Yield Clues to a Style, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 14, 2010,
http://www.nytimes.com/2010/04/15/us/politics/15scotus.html; see also Jess Bravin, Kagan and
Key
Case:
Jury
Still
Out,
WALL
ST.
J.,
May
12,
2010,
http://online.wsj.com/article/SB10001424052748703565804575238691604135782.html; Adam
Liptak, On Speech, Kagan Leaned Toward Conservatives, N.Y. TIMES, May 14, 2010,
http://www.nytimes.com/2010/05/16/us/politics/16court.html; Robert Barnes, In Elena Kagan’s
Work as Solicitor General, Few Clues to Her Views, WASH. POST, May 13, 2010,
http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2010/05/12/AR2010051205049.html;
Adam Liptak, On Speech, Kagan Leaned Toward Conservatives, N.Y. Times, May 16, 2010, at
A19, available at http://www.nytimes.com/2010/05/16/us/politics/16court.html.
30
Citizens United, 130 S.Ct. at 903.
31
Id. at 904.
32
See Hasen, supra note 7, at 599-600 (describing Chief Justice Roberts‘ concurring opinion).
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defend Austin‘s rationale:33 ―to the extent the Government relies on new
arguments—and declines to defend Austin on its own terms—we may reasonably
infer that it lacks confidence in that decision‘s original justification.‖34
The task then fell to Justice Stevens to defend the antidistortion rationale,
and in this task he fell short. In the midst of a very long dissent, Justice Stevens,
turned to the antidistortion rationale, and offered a hodge-podge of inconsistent
understandings of it. He began by denying any difference between the
anticorruption and antidistortion rationales: ―Understood properly, ‗antidistortion‘
is simply a variant on the classic governmental interest in protecting against
improper influences on officeholders that debilitate the democratic process. It is
manifestly not just an ‗equalizing‘ ideal in disguise.‖35 Justice Stevens then
argued that the antidistortion rationale should not be read as embracing an
equality rationale,36 though he acknowledged ―that Austin can bear an egalitarian
reading.‖37
Justice Stevens proceeded to discuss the differences between corporations
and live human beings, noting, among other things, that corporations can be
foreign owned, have limited liability, perpetual life, and do not engage in selfexpression the way human beings do.38 ―These basic points help explain why
corporate electioneering is not only more likely to impair compelling
governmental interests, but also why restrictions on that electioneering are less
likely to encroach upon First Amendment freedoms.‖39
Justice Stevens then rejected the argument that the public‘s interest in
hearing a corporation‘s ideas in the political marketplace justified First
Amendment protection for corporate spending. Citing a long history of public
concern about corporate interests dominating politics, Justice Stevens noted the
political equality concerns behind Austin: large corporate spending could
―marginalize[]‖ the opinions of ―real people‖ by ―drowning out non-corporate
voices.‖40 This in turn ―can generate the impression that corporations dominate

33

Citizens United, 130 S.Ct. at 923 (Roberts, C.J., concurring). The Chief Justice explained that
the Austin majority opinion relied upon neither the threat of quid pro quo corruption nor the need
for shareholder protection. Id. at 924.
34
Id.
35
Id. at 970 (Stevens, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part); see also id. at 970 n. 60
(disagreeing with the Chief Justice that there is ―nothing more to it‖ than equality).
36
Here, Justice Stevens relied upon that part of Austin quoted in footnote 63 below.
37
Citizens United, 130 S.Ct. at 970 n.69.
38
Id. at 970-72.
39
Id. at 972. Justice Stevens also noted that corporations actually wanted limits on spending to
prevent officeholders from ―shak[ing] them down for supportive ads.‖ Id. at 973.
40
Id. at 974.
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our democracy.‖41 Significantly, throughout this discussion, Justice Stevens never
acknowledged that these were political equality arguments.42
Justice Stevens then discussed the potential for corporations to gain
―special advantages in the market for legislation43 through rent-seeking.44
―Corporations…are uniquely equipped to seek laws that favor their owners, not
simply because they have a lot of money but because of their legal and
organizational structure. Remove all restrictions on their electioneering, and the
door may be opened to a type of rent seeking that is far more destructive than
what noncorporations are capable of.‖45
In concluding the dissent‘s section on the antidistortion interest, Justice
Stevens returned to a concern about corporations drowning out other political
ideas. ―In the real world, we have seen, corporate domination of the airwaves prior
to an election may decrease the average listener's exposure to relevant viewpoints,
and it may diminish citizens‘ willingness and capacity to participate in the
democratic process.‖46 He stated that an exception for media corporations might
be constitutionally required because of the unique information-providing role they
play in society, but the exception for media corporations did not doom the
constitutionality of corporate spending limits generally.47
There are many provocative and important ideas in Justice Stevens‘
dissent, but as a whole the antidistortion portion of the dissent does not cohere.
Justice Stevens began by denying any difference between anticorruption and
antidistortion arguments for limiting corporate spending, stating all the ideas are
about improper influences on officeholders. He then turned to arguments that
have nothing to do with quid pro quo corruption or undue influence (suggesting
that his equation of anticorruption and antidistortion was incorrect): that
corporations deserve less First Amendment protection than humans, that corporate
spending can ―drown out‖ the voices of non-corporate interests, that corporate
41

Id.; see also id. at 975-76 (―In the real world, we have seen, corporation domination of the
airwaves prior to an election may decrease the average listener‘s exposure to relevant viewpoints,
and it may diminish citizens willingness and capacity to participate in the democratic process.‖).
42
See Kathleen M. Sullivan, Two Concepts of Freedom of Speech, 124 HARV. L. REV. 143, 147-48
(2010) (―While Justice Stevens disputes the majority‘s characterization of this interest as
impermissibly advancing the ‗equalization‘ of speaking power, his own description suggests that it
is necessarily redistributive‖ (footnote omitted)).
43
Citizens United, 130 S.Ct. at 975. The dissent stated that corporations are ―uniquely equipped‖
to engage in this ―rent seeking.‖ Id. at 975.
44
For more on the rent-seeking rationale as used in Justice Stevens‘ dissent, see Richard L. Hasen,
Lobbying, Rent Seeking, and the Constitution, Loyola-LA Research Paper 2011-_ , available at:
[add SSRN citation].
45
Citizens United, 130 S.Ct. at 975 (quotations and citations omitted).
46
Id. at 975-76.
47
Id. at 976.
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spending can undermine voter confidence in our democracy, and that corporations
can act in ways that undermine the efficiency of government. The second of these
interests looks like the antidistortion rationale advanced in Austin, yet Justice
Stevens denied he was making a political equality argument. The other three
arguments are neither anticorruption nor antidistortion arguments. Whatever else
may be said of this jumble, the dissent in its treatment of antidistortion did not
offer a full-throated, carefully crafted endorsement of the rationale.
Oddly, Justice Stevens has offered political equality rationales for
campaign finance laws in the past. For example, in Randall v. Sorrell, Justice
Stevens speaking for himself alone argued in favor of the constitutionality of
limits on candidate spending, based in part on a political equality rationale.48
Perhaps Justice Stevens in Citizens United was constrained in offering these
arguments in order to keep the votes of other dissenters.49 Or perhaps Justice
Stevens did not feel comfortable embracing the political equality rationale fully
when the government chose to abandon it.50 Still, the fact that Justice Stevens
chose to highlight the antidistortion interest in his 60 Minutes interview shows
that the rationale remained important in his mind, months after he completed his
lengthy opinion and service on the Court.

48

Randall v. Sorrell, 548 U.S. 230, 278 (2006) (Stevens, J., dissenting) (―Not only do [candidate
spending] limits serve as an important complement to corruption-reducing contribution limits, but
they also ‗protect equal access to the political arena, [and] free candidates and their staffs from the
interminable burden of fundraising.‘ These last two interests are particularly acute. When
campaign costs are so high that only the rich have the reach to throw their hats into the ring, we fail
‗to protect the political process from undue influence of large aggregations of capital and to
promote individual responsibility for democratic government.‘ States have recognized this
problem, but Buckley‘s perceived ban on expenditure limits severely limits their options in dealing
with it.‖ (citations and footnote omitted); see also Colorado Republican Federal Campaign Comm.
v. Federal Election Comm‘n, 518 U.S. 604, 649 (1996) (Stevens, J., dissenting) (―Finally, I believe
the Government has an important interest in leveling the electoral playing field by constraining the
cost of federal campaigns.‖).
49
This possibility does not seem too likely. Justices Ginsburg and Breyer have endorsed a version
of the political equality rationale in the past. See Richard L. Hasen, Buckley is Dead: Long Live
Buckley: The New Campaign Finance Incoherence of McConnell v. FEC, 153 U. PA. L. REV. 31,
32 n.7 (2004). Justice Sotomayor has not weighed in on the political equality rationale, but she
served as a member of the New York City campaign finance board and in her writings seemed
generally supportive of campaign finance regulation. Kenneth P. Vogel, Sonya Sotomayor: No
empathy
for
campaign
cash,
POLITICO,
May
28,
2009,
available
at:
http://www.politico.com/news/stories/0509/23070.html.
50
After noting his earlier opinions accepting political equality rationales, Justice Stevens wrote in
his Citizens United dissent: ―I continue to adhere to these beliefs, but they have not been briefed by
the parties or amici in this case, and their soundness is immaterial to its proper disposition.‖
Citizens United, 130 S.Ct. at 963 n.65.
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II.
THE COSTS OF ORPHANING THE ANTIDISTORTION RATIONALE
At first glance, the government‘s abandonment of the antidistortion
rationale and Justice Stevens‘ distancing of himself from it seems inconsequential.
The five-Justice majority would not have been swayed to decide the case
differently had General Kagan or Justice Stevens wrapped themselves fully in the
Austin antidistortion argument. As Kathleen Sullivan has explained,51 the Justices
in the majority in Citizens United embrace a view of the First Amendment that is
liberty-protecting rather than equality-enhancing, and the antidistortion argument
cannot be squared with this liberty-protecting reading.
But the absence of a forthright defense of the antidistortion rationale from
the Citizens United dissent imposes real social costs. In a recent article in the
Minnesota Law Review,52 Justice Ginsburg explained the purposes served by
dissenting opinions. Besides an ―in-house‖ function to turn a dissent into a
majority opinion or to influence the writing of a majority opinion,53 dissents serve
two key public purposes: ―appealing to the intelligence of a future day‖54 and
―attract[ing] immediate public attention and, thereby, [propelling] legislative
change.‖55
Citizens United has been an unpopular decision in the public,56 and the
source of that unpopularity seems to be tied to the public‘s acceptance of
antidistortion and political equality concerns. When President Obama railed
against the decision, he spoke of corporations ―drown[ing out] the voices of
everyday Americans.‖57 Similarly, when Senator Arlen Specter gave his farewell
speech upon leaving the United States Senate, he condemned the opinion as
51

Sullivan, supra note 42.
Hon. Ruth Bader Ginsburg, The Role of Dissenting Opinions, 95 MINN. L. REV. 1 (2010).
53
Justice Ginsburg notes the possibility that drafting a dissent will sway a majority, something she
says happens no more than four times per term. Id. at 4. As noted above, I do not believe a dissent
could have served this purpose in this case. Note also Chief Justice Roberts‘ statement in his
Citizens United concurrence: ―We have also had the benefit of a comprehensive dissent that has
helped ensure that the Court has considered all the relevant issues.‖ Citizens United, 130 S.Ct. at
925 (Roberts, C.J., concurring).
54
Ginsburg, supra note 53, at 5 (quoting former Chief Justice Hughes).
55
Id.
56
Hasen, supra note 7, at 620 n. 58 (discussing public opinion polling on Citizens United).
57
Adam Liptak, Justices, 5-4, Reject Corporate Spending Limit, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 21, 2010,
available at: http://www.nytimes.com/2010/01/22/us/politics/22scotus.html (―President Obama
called [the decision] ‗a major victory for big oil, Wall Street banks, health insurance companies
and the other powerful interests that marshal their power every day in Washington to drown out the
voices of everyday Americans.‘‖).
52
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―effectively undermining the basic democratic principle of the power of one
person/one vote.‖58
Yet when campaign finance reform advocates embrace these rationales
and propose legislative changes based upon them, they face an uphill battle. A
four-Justice dissent in Citizens United fully embracing the political equality
rationale, and offering a considered and careful analysis of the question,59 would
have provided greater resonance for these rationales in the court of public opinion,
and it would set the stage for eventual judicial acceptance of the rationale in the
event that changes in Supreme Court personnel lead to a more receptive Court.
Stripped of even a four-Justice endorsement and careful exposition of the
political equality rationale, legal advocates with an eye on the courts are forced to
discuss their legislative proposals and legal arguments for campaign finance
regulations solely in other terms, such as anticorruption and shareholder
protection. While these may also be valid rationales to sustain some campaign
finance laws, promoting political equality is the real unspoken motivating force
behind many legislative proposals to ameliorate the effects of Citizens United and
to defend existing campaign finance laws against First Amendment challenge.
Some advocates appear to speak in ―don‘t ask, don‘t tell‖ mode, motivated by
political equality concerns, but voicing their concerns as something else.60
Aside from providing a public imprimatur of political equality as a key
state interest to be balanced against First Amendment rights in campaign finance
cases, a dissent expressly embracing the rationale could have provided greater
clarity on thorny issues related to the political equality rationale, which would
have benefitted legislators, the public, and eventually the courts.
58

Jessica Brady, Specter: ‘Court Has Been Eating Congress’ Lunch’, ROLL CALL, Dec. 21, 2010,
available at: http://www.rollcall.com/news/-201782-1.html (quoting Senator Specter). For a
careful analysis of the basis of populist concern about the Citizens United decision, see Justin
Levitt, Confronting the Impact of Citizens United, 29 YALE L. & POL‘Y REV. Part II ___
(forthcoming
2010),
draft
available
at:
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1676108
59
Cass Sunstein, Ned Foley, Justice Breyer and others have set out competing visions of political
equality in the campaign finance context, and how it may be reconciled with the First Amendment.
See, e.g., Cass Sunstein, Political Equality and Unintended Consequences, 94 COLUM L. REV.
1390 (1994); Edward B. Foley, Equal-Dollars-Per-Voter: A. Constitutional Principle of Campaign
Finance, 94 COLUM. L. REV. 1204 (1994); STEPHEN BREYER, ACTIVE LIBERTY: INTERPRETING
OUR DEMOCRATIC CONSTITUTION (2005). A dissent would have benefitted from a cogent and
thoughtful consideration of these sources or others, in setting out the rationale.
60
Bruce Cain, Shade from the Glare: The Case for Semi-Disclosure, Cato Unbound, Lead Essay,
Nov. 8, 2010, available at: http://www.cato-unbound.org/2010/11/08/bruce-cain/shade-from-theglare-the-case-for-semi-disclosure/ (―using transparency as a weapon to combat inequality of voice
is a dangerous game to play. It promotes forms of disclosure that are not narrowly tailored and
invites closer Court scrutiny of disclosure laws‖).
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Political equality is a broad term, and antidistortion is just one way of
conceptualizing it. Recall that in Austin the Court conceived of equality in terms
of the ability of corporate spenders to persuade voters how to vote, and said that
large corporate spending could distort the outcome of elections.61 Similarly, in
Caperton v. Massey, the Court held that a judge who benefitted from over $3
million in contributions to fund independent campaign spending on the judge‘s
behalf had to recuse himself from a case involving the contributor. The
contributor‘s hefty spending, making up the vast majority of the total spending
supporting the judicial candidate in the election, had a ―significant and
disproportionate influence‖ on the candidate‘s election.‖62 A variation on this
antidistortion principle is that each speaker must have an equal opportunity to
persuade, an idea that the Court in Austin appeared to reject.63
These antidistortion arguments are premised on the idea that voters
respond to the sheer amount of advertising for a candidate in an election, though it
is not clear whether the ―drowning out‖ idea is more one about the wealthy buying
up all the available advertising space on limited media such as television or about
large spenders so inundating viewers with a message that viewers are persuaded to
vote in a particular way, even if there is contrary advertising from others.64
Other political equality arguments are premised less on the electoral
results of unequal campaign spending and more on the legislative results.
Independent spending favoring officeholders (or attacking their opponents) can
help spenders curry favor with elected officials, and legislative actions therefore
may be skewed toward the interests of the big spenders.65 This is a distortion of
legislative rather than electoral outcomes. The constitutional case for this type of
equality argument might be different than an argument premised on concern about
distortion of electoral outcomes.
Regardless of which type of political equality argument should be pursued,
it will be important to articulate precisely how far the relevant equality principle
61

Austin, 494 U.S. at 658-60.
129 S.Ct. 2252, 2263-64 (2009). Justice Kennedy authored both majority opinions and was the
only Justice in the majority in both cases. On the tensions between Justice Kennedy‘s positions in
Caperton and Citizens United, see Hasen, supra note 7, at 611-15.
63
―The Act does not attempt ‗to equalize the relative influence of speakers on elections,‘; rather, it
ensures that expenditures reflect actual public support for the political ideas espoused by
corporations.‖ Austin, 494 U.S. at 660 (citations omitted). It was never clear to me that the Court
here articulated a sensible distinction between the antidistortion argument it endorsed and the
equality argument it purported to reject in this sentence.
64
The former argument is weaker than the latter to the extent that voters receive more information
via sources with fewer limits on advertising, such as Internet web pages.
65
I have long advocated this view of political equality in my writing on campaign finance. See,
e.g., Richard L. Hasen, Clipping Coupons for Democracy: An Egalitarian/Public Choice Defense
of Campaign Finance Vouchers, 84 CAL. L. REV. 1 (1996).
62
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can go consistent with protection of freedom of speech and association. As
Richard Briffault explains, ―It is not possible to truly equalize influence over
elections. Indeed, given the value of robust and uninhibited political participation
and the extensive regulation it would take to assure total equality, assuring
absolutely equal influence over elections is not even desirable. Nevertheless,
dramatically unequal campaign spending that reflects underlying inequalities of
wealth is in sharp tension with the one person, one vote principle enshrined in our
civic culture and our constitutional law.‖66
How should the balance be struck? The specter of bureaucratic bookbanning and Internet censoring figured heavily into the rhetoric of the Citizens
United majority opinion, as did federal law‘s exceptionalism for media
corporations. On top of these concerns are ones about campaign finance
legislation, if passed by a legislature rather than through a voter initiative, that can
serve to protect incumbents from political competition. These are weighty
concerns, which should not be dismissed lightly by those believing political
equality may serve as a compelling interest to justify campaign finance regulation.
Justice Breyer has given great thought to the intersection of the First
Amendment and equality principles, and argues for a careful balancing in of rights
and interests in this context, recognizing First Amendment concerns on both sides
of the controversy.67 Under his ―participatory self-government‖ variant of the
political equality rationale, courts would closely scrutinize laws passed in the
name of political equality, ensuring that the laws were not passed as incumbency
protection measures and that there is robust political competition.68 But Justice
Breyer‘s ideas need further thinking going forward, as the Internet affects both the
cost of campaign advertising and its effects on the electorate and as the public
now experiences elections without corporate (and labor union) spending limits.
Resolution of all of these difficult, subsidiary questions, however, will
have to wait a day far in the future, in part because of the abandonment of the
antidistortion rationale by the dissenters in Citizens United. It could well be
another generation before the Court approaches these issues again, and at that
point there will be some serious intellectual work ahead.
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Richard Briffault, Public Funding and Democratic Elections, 148 U. PA. L. REV. 563, 577-78
(1999).
67
See Breyer, supra note 59.
68
I describe the rationale in Hasen, supra note 49.
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